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BANKRUPTCY-THE LAST
RESORT:
PROTECTING THE DIOCESAN
CLIENT FROM POTENTIAL
LIABILITY JUDGMENTS
JOHN B. JARBOE*
Prior to 1978, bankruptcy protection was available only to
individuals and institutions who were insolvent-those whose
assets exceeded liability on the balance sheet. Since the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1 however, bankruptcy has become a
tool for use in planning and assisting not only individuals and
institutions with solvency problems, but those with liquidity
problems as well. In Johns-Manville,2 for example, the large
manufacturer of asbestos products was confronted with literally
thousands of lawsuits involving potentially billions of dollars in
damages. Although solvent on the balance sheet, Johns-
. John B. Jarboe is a shareholder and chairman of the Tulsa, Oklahoma law firm
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business law, estate planning, and probate. Mr. Jarboe received his undergraduate
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versity of Tulsa, where he served as editor-in-chief of the Tulsa Law Journal. A for-
mer trial attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., Mr.
Jarboe is a member of the National Diocesan Attorneys Association, the Oklahoma
Bar Association, and the Louisiana Bar Association. He has been a member of the
Antitrust and Public Contract Law Sections of the American Bar Association and
served as the founding chairman of the Bankruptcy and Reorganization Section of
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Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330 (1994) as amended in
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996).
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Manville sought bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code to manage what was otherwise financial chaos.
Thus, while it is possible that by invoking the bankruptcy proc-
ess one may risk trading one form of expensive chaos for an-
other, Chapter 11 does provide the potential for bringing some
manageability to the process.
THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, an estate is created,
much like a probate estate.3 This estate both determines and
limits the recovery of creditors and is comprised of all of the
debtor's assets as of the day that the bankruptcy petition is filed.
To the extent that the estate is insufficient to satisfy the claims
of creditors, the Bankruptcy Code provides certain priorities,4
which require full and pro rata payments to be made to a senior
class of creditors before the next junior class may receive any
distributions. Therefore, the process for determining classes of
creditors provided by Chapter 11 is extremely important in es-
tablishing a plan of reorganization.
While the bankruptcy estate includes every property interest
of the debtor, the estate also includes those interests that may be
recovered through the avoiding powers granted to the trustee.
These powers include the avoidance of certain pre-petition trans-
fers, such as fraudulent conveyances or preferential transfers.
Property of the estate, however, does not include property which
is held in trust by the debtor for another entity. This under-
scores the importance of separately maintaining property owned
outright by the debtor from property of which the debtor may be
a beneficiary or a fiduciary.
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of a
trustee in all liquidation cases and generally provides for the re-
tention of the debtor in possession in reorganization cases.5 The
benefit in a reorganization is, of course, that the debtor may re-
main in possession and manage its affairs free of a trustee. This
advantage comes at a price, however, in that the debtor in pos-
session is charged with both the rights and the fiduciary re-
3 11 U.S.C. § 541.
11 U.S.C. § 507.
11 U.S.C. § 701.
S11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
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sponsibilities of a trustee in bankruptcy.7 In many Chapter 11
cases, therefore, even though a trustee may not be appointed, the
debtor is under pressure to avoid some of its own transfers under
the scrutiny of the bankruptcy court and the creditors' commit-
tee.
Chapter 7, the liquidation chapter of the Bankruptcy Code,
provides a procedure in which all assets are first surrendered to
a trustee and then distributed to creditors in prioritized classes.!
The first to be paid are the administrative expenses of the estate,
certain wage benefits, and taxes. Next, the general unsecured
claims are paid to the extent of actual pecuniary loss. Following
that are unsecured claims of a penalty type. This suggests that
where assets are insufficient to satisfy liabilities, punitive dam-
ages and other penalties may be subordinated to the claims of
general creditors, such as the trade creditors. Moreover, in a
Chapter 7 case, only an individual can receive a discharge. ° Be-
cause corporations and other entities do not receive a discharge
in the procedure, Chapter 7 essentially offers no protection to
such entities that intend to continue in business after bank-
ruptcy.
Chapter 11 is the reorganization chapter most frequently
utilized by ongoing organizations. Reorganization involves a
plan, usually proposed by the debtor, for the orderly distribution
of assets upon either the approval of creditors or, if fair and equi-
table, over creditor objection." Courts interpret the term "fair
' See id. ("A debtor in possession ... shall perform all the functions and duties
of a trustee.").
' Those transfers which the debtor may be under pressure to avoid include prefer-
ential transfers, defined by the Bankruptcy Code as any transfer made within 90
days preceding the bankruptcy on an antecedent debt which allows the transferee
creditor to recover a greater portion of that debt than it would have received in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). The Bankruptcy Code also con-
tains a fraudulent conveyance provision which provides for the avoidance of those
transfers made for inadequate consideration or transfers made with actual intent to
hinder and delay creditors. Id. § 548. Another means of avoiding fraudulent trans-
fers is the statute of limitations, which is one year for bankruptcy. Id. The trustee
in bankruptcy, however, is cloaked with the status of a levying creditor, and thus is
given the benefit in bankruptcy court of the statute of limitations which exists in the
forum state. In Oklahoma, for instance, the statute of limitations on fraudulent
conveyances is four years, thereby enabling a trustee or debtor in possession to go
back four years to avoid such transfers.
9 11 U.S.C. § 726.
10 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) ("The court ... shall confirm the plan ... if the plan does
not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable with respect to each class of
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and equitable" to mean essentially that creditors receive the
same value under the Chapter 11 plan as they would receive un-
der Chapter 7. Thus, if the plan meets the fair and equitable
standard, and does not discriminate unfairly between creditors,
a debtor's plan can be approved over the objection of creditors.
The significance of a plan of reorganization is that it allows
the debtor to offer other value as a substitution for assets which
the debtor does not wish to relinquish.' 2 "Other value" includes,
for instance, future earnings. Although the value that has to be
offered to the creditors in the plan must be equal to the assets of
the debtor on the date of filing, not every asset must necessarily
be surrendered in the process. Since the plan can be paid out
over time, future revenues may be substituted for those assets
which a trustee would otherwise take in a liquidation bank-
ruptcy. Thus, Chapter 11 provides an opportunity to protect as-
sets that may not be protected in any other context.
Generally, bankruptcy may be initiated either voluntarily by
the debtor or involuntarily, by three creditors holding claims to-
taling at least $10,000 in the aggregate. 3 Section 303 of the
Code, however, exempts eleemosynary institutions from involun-
tary bankruptcy.'4 Thus, charitable organizations, including
churches, etc., may not be placed in an involuntary bankruptcy
and a diocese, therefore, can invoke the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court only as a conscious, voluntary decision. In the case
of In re Allen University,5 for example, a university was found to
be exempt from involuntary bankruptcy despite operating sev-
eral commercial enterprises. Unlike other areas of the law
where charitable exemptions are at risk of loss, charitable or-
ganizations may not partially or wholly lose the benefits of the
exemption from involuntary bankruptcy. 6
Regarding the eligibility to file in bankruptcy, an incorpo-
rated diocese is clearly eligible to file Chapter 11.'" Although
some questions may remain about the eligibility of unincorpo-
claims of interest that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.").
12 1 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i-ii).
" 11 U.S.C. § 301 (voluntary cases); 11 U.S.C. § 303 (involuntary cases).
14 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).
'5 In re Allen University, 497 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1974).6 11 U.S.C. § 1112.
17 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (providing that "any person that resides or has a domicile, a
place of business, or property in the United States, or a municipality, may be a
debtor under this title."). Section 101 defines any "person" as any individual, part-
nership, or corporation. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41).
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rated associations to file bankruptcies, most of the cases dealing
with churches or other unincorporated charitable and religious
organizations have held that such organizations are eligible to
file under Chapter 11.18 An unincorporated diocese, therefore,
could likely take advantage of that protection if necessary.
THE BENEFITS OF BANKRUPTCY
Given this background, how does a diocese, or any religious
organization, benefit from filing in bankruptcy? The first bene-
fit, a corner stone of bankruptcy, is the automatic stay provided
by Section 362 of the Code. 9 When a bankruptcy petition is
filed, an automatic stay is imposed which operates as an injunc-
tion, prohibiting any proceeding against the debtor or debtor's
property. The bankruptcy court jurisdiction is nationwide, pro-
tecting the property of the debtor wherever located. In a case in-
volving a trustee, the automatic stay allows the trustee to gather
and distribute assets without interference from third parties. In
a Chapter 11 case, the automatic stay immediately stops any ac-
tion, such as attachment of bank accounts, against the debtor.
Thus, the automatic stay provides the debtor with a certain
amount of breathing room in which to concentrate on long-term
planning.
The automatic stay, along with a continuing injunction pro-
vided upon the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, prevents
creditors from attaching specific assets as long as such creditors
are offered equivalent value under the plan. This ability to pri-
oritize the assets to be sacrificed to fund the plan allows a debtor
to protect important assets which do not have any legal signifi-
cance or status of their own under the Bankruptcy Code. Substi-
tution of future income, therefore, may be a means of protecting
diocesan works of art, antiquities, and other valued assets.
A second important benefit of bankruptcy involves the
valuation hearing conducted to determine the asset pool neces-
sary to fund the plan."° Again, the creditors are entitled to re-
cover only the value of what the debtor had on the day of the
filing of the petition. Thus, the valuation hearings are likely to
8 See, e.g., In re Miracle Church of God in Christ, 119 B.R. 308 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990); see also In re Sanders, 91 B.R. 317 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re United
Church of the Ministers of God, 84 B.R. 50 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
19 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362.
20 11 U.S.C. § 341(a).
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estimate properties at liquidation values as opposed to ongoing
business values, since the creditors are only necessarily entitled
to recover the equivalent of a Chapter 7 liquidation. A church
building, for example, would only be valued at what a willing
buyer would pay at a foreclosure sale for a special purpose piece
of property, rather than at its replacement or book value. Again,
the process allows the debtor to prioritize properties, rather than
waiting for creditors to pick and choose the assets they wish to
levy.
The notion of prioritizing things of value is illustrated by a
story about two fellows on a camping trip. They awoke one
morning, bright and early, to see a huge brown bear lumbering
down at them as fast as the bear could go. One of the fellows
calmly sat down and started putting on his running shoes, while
his panicky friend said, "What in the world are you doing? You
can't possibly outrun that bear." The fellow lacing up the shoes
calmly looked at his friend and said "I don't have to outrun that
bear. All I've got to do is outrun you." In a similar fashion,
Chapter 11 provides an opportunity in the face of imminent dis-
aster to exchange prioritized sacrifices for that which is really
important.
A third advantage of Chapter 11 is that a corporate debtor
may discharge debts which an individual debtor may not dis-
charge in Chapter 7. These debts include, most notably, claims
for punitive damages or for willful and malicious injury." Puni-
tive damages may be subordinated to the claims of general credi-
tors or discharged entirely if the available assets in the asset
pool are insufficient to satisfy all claims. A plan, once confirmed,
defines all rights of the creditors who receive only what is in the
plan. Therefore, if the asset pool, which the debtor must estab-
lish to fund the plan, is insufficient to satisfy even those claims
having a higher priority than punitive damages, such claims may
be discharged.
Although the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate issues of causation and damages in tort, the court
does play a role in the Code process for the estimation of claims,
both for the purpose of allowing voting to confirm a plan and for
21 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (providing that confirmation of plan "discharges the debtor
from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation.); 11 U.S.C. §
726(a)(4) (allowing distribution in payment for any fine, penalty, forfeiture, or puni-
tive damages).
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determining whether the plan is fair and equitable." The bank-
ruptcy court estimates the debtor's likely tort and other liabili-
ties to arrive at a number against which the plan is evaluated.
It is thus possible to predict in the plan what kind of pro rata
distribution would be received by creditors.
This estimation process, while not res judicata as to causa-
tion and damages, does allow a goal to be set and establishes a
target which is used to determine whether the distribution of as-
sets to a class of creditors meets the fair and equitable test. In
addition, even though the estimation is not binding, it still per-
forms an important function. The court, evaluating the estima-
tion as a third party, subjects claims to a process similar to
alternative dispute resolution. Therefore, the estimation may
have positive effects on settlement negotiations. Ultimately, the
estimation process is used to define and limit the available asset
pool from which claims are paid.
One of the most important benefits offered by the Bank-
ruptcy Code is a binding notice and bar date which meet consti-
tutional due process standards.2 Indeed, it is possible for a
debtor to discharge even those debts of which it is unaware and,
in some instances, claims of which the holder is currently un-
aware. The Code provides that confirmation of a Chapter 11
plan discharges all debts except as otherwise specifically pro-
vided in the plan. 4 These debts do not need to be liquidated, nor
do they need to be represented by a filed claim. If the notices of
the bankruptcy and the hearing confirmation are adequate to
satisfy constitutional due process requirements, those claims
may be discharged. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,2 the Supreme Court held that a publication notice
constituted adequate notice for unidentified, conjectural benefi-
ciaries. Similarly, in Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Rob-
ins),"6 the Fourth Circuit approved a notice discharging future
claims because such notice was not substantially less likely to
provide notice than other feasible and customary substitutes. In
22 The Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over the relationship between a debtor
and creditor, however, a tort victim does not become a creditor until a court settle-
ment or judgment makes him so. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Quality Pipeline, Inc., 469
So. 2d. 820, 823-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1985).
21 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1128-29,
24 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).
25 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
2' 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989).
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mass tort claims where there is reasonable certainty of future
claims, courts have taken an additional step. By appointing ei-
ther committees or representatives to be involved in the plan
confirmation process representing the rights of unknown future
claimants, the courts have found procedural due process to be
satisfied.2 7 These appointments by the courts are thus consid-
ered sufficient to discharge, or at least deal with, those claims
that are not filed, and perhaps, unknown to the debtor at the
time of filing. Therefore, a diocese should be able to provide a
notice stating:
Diocese 'X' has filed bankruptcy in the bankruptcy court of the
district of 'X,' and any person having a claim resulting from the
intentional or negligent injury caused by a person acting on be-
half of or in the name of the Diocese is directed to file such claim
by such and such bar date, and if not, it will be forever barred.
It may even be possible to discharge claims of which the
claimant is unaware, as long as they exist at the time of the fil-
ing, and provided the notice is adequate. It may also be possible,
under similar circumstances, to bar even repressed memory
cases in states which have the discovery rule as a basis for the
statute of limitations. Although it is impossible to prevent the
filing of future actions to test the adequacy of notice, one can bet-
ter defend such suits if a final order exists based upon at least
one court's notion of constitutional due process.
An additional benefit of bankruptcy, as indicated in the
Johns-Manville and A. H. Robins mass tort cases, is the provi-
sion of a single forum for global settlement with insurance com-
panies and tort claimants. Courts have held that the proceeds of
liability insurance policies are property of the estate because
these policies are assets from which creditors' claims may be
satisfied.28 In addition, cases have suggested that the bank-
ruptcy court itself has jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judg-
ment action on coverage issues since coverage affects the
administration of the bankruptcy estate. 9 Although several
courts have held that jurisdiction exists where insurance cover-
27 See In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, 878 F. Supp.
473 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1995); UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR
Industries, Inc., 124 B.R. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1990); In re UNR Industries, 46 B.R. 671
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
21 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 92 B.R. 472 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988); In re Hawkeye
Chemical Co., 71 B.R. 315 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
29 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 76 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
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age produces an asset that is property of the estate, 30 a bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction to hear that type of action may not be
absolute.31 Furthermore, courts have held that the plan and
confirmation order may provide an injunction which protects the
insurance companies from further action as long as they have
contributed to the tort settlement.32 Although the Bankruptcy
Code provides for discharge of only the debtor's obligations, in
cases where the insurance companies have contributed, courts
have issued what are called "channeling orders," which channel
claims of all creditors to the asset pool created by the insurance
company contribution. Thus, the debtor may effectively enjoin
the claimants from pursuing any other property or remedy. The
Johns-Manville plan, which included such a trust and asset pool,
was recently codified into the Bankruptcy Code, but applies only
to asbestos bankruptcies.33 Interestingly enough, the other mass
tort cases were not included at the time.
If the insurance company does not cooperate in the creation
of a settlement pool, any claim retained under subrogation rights
may possibly be discharged in the plan as a contingent liability
in existence at the time of confirmation.34 Not surprisingly,
when the threat of bankruptcy becomes real, insurance compa-
nies are quite interested. Furthermore, notwithstanding subro-
gation rights, claims of insurance companies may be discharged
just as tort claims to the extent that assets are insufficient.
THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF BANKRUPTCY
The benefits provided by the Bankruptcy Code come at a
price, however, and include some negative considerations. First,
bankruptcy is an expensive and cumbersome proceeding and, in
response to this expense, the use of "pre-packaged plans" is in-
creasing. These plans are Chapter 11 filings for the purpose of
obtaining court approval on settlements that are essentially
30 In re United States Lines, Inc., 169 B.R. 804 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re
Doeningtown Indus. & Agric. Sch., 172 B.R. 813 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); In re Kilen,
129 B.R. 538 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Korhumel Indus., Inc., 103 B.R. 917 (N.D.
Ill. 1989).
"' See In re Power Lab Inc., 184 B.R. 511 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995); cf In re Titan
Energy, Inc., 837 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction but upholding court's decision to abstain).
32 UNARCO, 124 B.R. 268 (1990).
33 11 U.S.C. § 524.
34 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).
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worked out and are typically filed together with the petition
rather than at a later date. Thus, in cases where a settlement
has been essentially worked out, use of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
can help prevent minor players from rejecting a deal at the last
minute. Nevertheless, unless the majority of creditors have ac-
cepted some kind of plan, the proceedings in bankruptcy can be
lengthy, cumbersome, and very expensive.
A second negative consideration under Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation involves the appointment of a creditor's committee, 35 typi-
cally drawn from among the twenty largest unsecured creditors.
In the case of a diocese with significant tort liability, the credi-
tors' committee is likely to include the tort claimants and their
attorneys. Membership on that committee facilitates access to
and review of the records and ongoing affairs of the diocese on a
day-to-day basis. A creditors' committee also has the right to bill
the debtor for the cost of administration, including attorney and
accountant fees, dramatically increasing the expense of a bank-
ruptcy. In addition, creditors' committees can raise and com-
ment on any issue in the case as part of their authority to
investigate the affairs of the debtor. Several courts have con-
strued this as constituting authority for the creditors' committee
to actually bring an action if the committee determines that the
debtor in possession is not sufficiently aggressive in pursuing
such things as equitable actions, fraudulent conveyances, avoid-
ances, etc.36
A substantial negative factor to be considered in a diocesan
bankruptcy proceeding is the possibility of subjecting other
church entities to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court on
theories of substantive consolidation, alter ego, or contribution.
Critical to that determination is whether the debtor has indis-
criminately transferred funds back and forth between affiliates,
or whether it has acted as though an affiliate is effectively the
same entity as the debtor. The trustee or the debtor in posses-
sion has both the right and obligation to bring any action at law
which might enhance the estate and thus, the recovery of the
creditors. These potential actions include contribution actions
35 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
8 Sections 1103 and 1109 imply a qualified right to initiate proceedings when the
trustee or debtor in possession unjustifiably fails to bring suit or abuses its discre-
tion in not suing to avoid a preferential transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(5) and
1109(b).
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against other dioceses, treatment hospitals, religious organiza-
tions, or others for damages caused by an offending priest. The
risk does exist in bankruptcy that a trustee or a creditors' com-
mittee may institute an action in bankruptcy court that the
debtor does not wish to pursue. Contributions, for example,
which a diocese made, without consideration, to support one of
its affiliated entities over the years, may be subject to avoidance
as fraudulent conveyances, even if the affiliated entity can es-
tablish and prove its separateness. Restricted gifts and trusts,
moreover, are also at risk for avoidance. Here, the key determi-
nation is whether the restrictions have been properly docu-
mented and honored in practice, or whether the funds have been
treated as though available for the general purposes of the dio-
cese.
Another negative aspect of bankruptcy is the risk of dis-
missal. In situations where the debtor is unable to gain approval
of a plan, the court can either convert to Chapter 7. dismiss the
case, or appoint a trustee. Section 1112(c) states that a court
cannot convert to a Chapter 7 if the debtor is not a moneyed
business or commercial corporation."7 In the case of a religious
organization, therefore, dismissal is certainly more likely than
conversion to Chapter 7. Another option is the appointment of a
trustee, whose function is either to liquidate the assets of the
debtor or to run the business until a plan is approved and ihe
enterprise is turned over to management." While it is conceiv-
able that a trustee could serve as a receiver for property of the
diocese while the plan is being formulated, a bankruptcy court is
unlikely to undertake that kind of delicate balancing of respon-
sibilities. Therefore, if a trustee would normally be appointed in
a commercial case, the court would probably dismiss the bank-
ruptcy of a religious organization, leaving it to deal with credi-
tors one on one.
In addition, there are serious administrative inconveniences
and expenses involved in bankruptcy. First, the act of filing a
bankruptcy is in itself an alienation of 100 percent of the assets
of the diocese. Such an action cannot be undertaken without the
", 11 U.S.C. § 1112(c) ("The court may not convert a case under this chapter to a
case under chapter 7 of this title if the debtor is a farmer or a corporation that is not
moneyed, business, or commercial corporation unless the debtor requests such con-
version.").
" 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
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consent of the Holy See.39 This is a major stumbling block be-
cause it prevents bankruptcy from being used quickly to head off
a sheriffs sale or a levy on assets. The cost, as previously dis-
cussed, cannot be underestimated as a factor. Indeed, cost may
very well be the stumbling block that prevents bankruptcy from
being effective.
Several non-legal considerations must also govern the deci-
sion whether or not to utilize bankruptcy as a tool. First of all,
the inevitable publicity and increase in media attention to the af-
fairs of the Church is unlikely to be positive. Certainly, tensions
will be heightened with parishes, the chancery, and other dioce-
san entities whose assets might be threatened. Also, the impact
of filing bankruptcy on annual appeals, donations, and other
fundraising drives would probably be negative, particularly
where people believe that the funds they are asked to give will be
administered by a bankruptcy court. Finally, it is important to
realize that bankruptcy is merely a monetary solution to under-
lying economic problems. To the extent that the diocese's prob-
lems result from tort or individual injury problems, a bankruptcy
plan which quantifies claims does not assist, and may indeed
hamper, the ability of a diocese to offer alternatives such as non-
monetary assistance to victims as part of possible settlements.
CONCLUSION
As a final comment, effective bankruptcy planning should be
done prior to the eve of bankruptcy. Otherwise, options may be
limited. Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to threaten bankruptcy
without being prepared to carry it out. Keep in mind that asset
protection planning is, in effect, bankruptcy planning. If asset
protection is properly planned in advance, Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy may provide a somewhat comfortable refuge for a diocese,
rather than a very uncomfortable last resort.
" J. Michael Fitzgerald, The Official Catholic Directory: Civil and Canon Law Re-
quirements, 30 CATH. LAW. 107, 129 (1986) (requiring approval of Holy See when
alienation constitutes greater than one million dollars of property value as well as
for "vowed property" or property which has historic or artistic value).
